

Inter-firm Partnerships, Opportunism and Control in the Australian Recruitment Services

Industry

Mr. Stephane Bignoux

Department of Business, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia

Email: sbignoux@efs.mq.edu.au

Ms. Helene Mountford

Department of Business, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia

Email: hmountfo@efs.mq.edu.au

Dr. David Gray

Department of Business, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia

Email: dgray@efs.mq.edu.au

Inter-firm Partnerships, Opportunism and Control in the Australian Recruitment Services Industry

Mr. Stephane Bignoux *

Department of Business, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia

Ms. Helene Mountford

Department of Business, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia

Dr. David Gray

Department of Business, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia

ABSTRACT

This paper adopts a conceptual approach drawing on economic theory to analyze the antecedents and consequences of opportunism in the Australian recruitment industry. The paper finds that the antecedents of opportunism are low unemployment leading to skills shortages, ageing population leading to a decrease in the total number of workers and the imposition of preferred supplier and partnership agreements on client firm managers. The main consequences of opportunism are non-compliance with the terms and conditions of the contract and partnerships dissatisfaction. However, the paper argues that this problem can be managed through a redefinition of labor and changes to hiring practices, and also through the tightening of control over the client firm.

Keywords: Strategic human resource management, Human Resource Management and Development, recruitment, human resource management and organizational performance, skills shortages

In spite of its importance to the Australian economy, the employment services industry has suffered from a chronic lack of research. Most studies conducted, so far, have focused on (1) the failures of the industry (Stanworth & Druker 2006; Theodore & Peck 2002; Ward 2004), (2) exploitation of the worker (Davidov 2004; Forde & Slater 2006) and (3) the reasons for using agencies (Adler 2003; Cully, Woodland, O'Reilly & Dix 1999; Hall 2002).

The aim of this paper is to redress this imbalance in the literature by investigating relationships and partnerships in the recruitment industry. More specifically, this paper investigates the causes and effects of opportunism in these inter-firm relationships. This paper is conceptually based. As such, it provides the foundation for later empirical work to be undertaken but does provide any empirical data on

the phenomenon itself. Three research questions are put forth to aid in the discussion of opportunism: (1) what are the antecedents of opportunism in the recruitment industry? (2) what are the consequences of opportunism in the recruitment industry? And (3) how can recruitment firms minimize the effects of opportunism in recruitment industry? The answers to these questions are summed up in five propositions.

This paper contributes to the literature in two main ways. First, although the literature on ageing is substantial, few scholars have analyzed the implications of the labor shortage on stability of relationships and partnerships in this industry. This shortage of supply is expected to have a significant impact on the stability of these inter-organizational relationships. Second, there is very little literature analyzing the interaction of social relationships with business policies. More specifically, there is a lack of research on how imposed company policies interfere with existing social ties of managers. This is an extremely interesting issue that has not been significantly investigated in the management or human resources literature. Social networks, weak ties, trust and reciprocity are topics that are currently en vogue. As such, a discussion of these issues will be beneficial for both the management and human resources field.

THE AUSTRALIAN RECRUITMENT SERVICES INDUSTRY

There are, for the most part, two principal types of staffing relationships in the Australian recruitment industry: (1) preferred supplier agreements and (2) managed vendor agreements. Using Webster (1992), each type of recruitment can be classified as either relational or partnership based. Preferred supplier agreements are considered to be relationships as these agreements are contractually based but adversarial in nature. Client firms often engage with several preferred suppliers forcing each supplier to compete for business. On the other hand, managed vendor services are considered to be partnerships as these relationships are long-term and involve significant economic and social ties (Webster 1992).

Preferred Supplier Agreements

Preferred supplier agreements occur when client firms contract with one or more agencies to supply part of their workforce (Purcell, Purcell & Tailby 2004). Client firms generally prefer multi-sourcing because it allows them to retain the benefits associated with sole suppliers, i.e. an understanding of the client's business, while at the same time retaining the buyer's choice. An additional advantage of multi-sourcing is that it allows clients to source different types of skills from specialist agencies. Although most client firms engage four or fewer agencies as preferred suppliers (Druker & Stanworth 2001), these agencies are not kept at arms length. Preferred suppliers often have close but informal relationships with client firms. Client firms usually have a preference for dealing informally with a small number of organizations who are known and whose approach is familiar (Druker & Stanworth 2001).

Managed Vendor Services

A managed vendor is an agency that administers all the client firm's needs by subcontracting work to other staffing vendors. In this relationship, the agency will not place any of its own workers. The agency simply acts as a manager in the relationship between the client and other vendors. Firms usually hire outside non-staffing vendors to standardize the hiring process and manage the relationship between themselves and staffing vendors. In effect, a non-staffing vendor is an intermediary between the client and its staffing vendors. Managing vendors are usually contracted when the percentage of non-core employees continues to grow and/or earlier outsourcing models fail to achieve the expected results (Lanza, Maryn & Elders 2003).

OPPORTUNISM

For the purposes of this research, opportunism is defined as 'deceit oriented violation of implicit or explicit promises about one's appropriate or required role behaviour' (John 1984: 279). In the client/agency relationship, opportunism refers to the concern that elements within the client firm may not work towards the mutual interest of the relationship or partnership and that they may not cooperate in a

manner specified by the partners. This form of opportunism is not a form of deviant workplace behavior, as described in the management/HR literature. Deviant behavior involves damaging production and/or property, badmouthing others and the use of personal aggression (Robinson & Bennett 1995). Instead, it is a concerted attempt by managers to avoid fulfilling obligations by withholding valuable information from inter-organizational partners.


The Antecedents of Opportunism in the Recruitment Industry

There are several causes of opportunism in the recruitment industry. First, over the next 5-20 years, Australian demographics will change radically. Second, opportunism can be the result of resistance caused by the imposition of the supplier agreement on client firm managers.

Ageing population and economic growth. The Australian Bureau of Statistics projects the median age of Australia's population will increase from 36.4 years in 2004 to between 39.9 and 41.7 years in 2021 and between 44.6 and 48.2 years in 2051 (ABS 2007b). This trend became visible in 1996 and has steadily increased. See Figure 1 for a pictorial representation of the changes in the demographics of the Australian population (ABS 2007c).

TABLES AND FIGURES

Figure 1: Age and Gender Distribution (1996 and 2006)



This change in demographics is expected to have a significant impact on the availability of workers in the Australian economy. All industries are expected to suffer. However, those industries with the largest number of mature employees will suffer most. The education industry employed the highest number of mature workers in 2003-04 with 47 per cent of people in education aged 45-64 years (ABS 2005). The health and community services industry employed the next highest proportion of older workers (42 per cent) followed by the electricity, gas and water supply, government administration and defense, and agriculture, forestry and fishing industries each with 41 per cent of workers aged between 45 and 64 years (ABS 2005).

A precursor to this problem is visible today as the Australian economy experiences its second longest period of economic growth in recorded history (ABS 2007b). In the year to end September 2007, the Australian economy grew by 4.3 per cent (ABS 2007a). The strength of the current economy has produced the lowest unemployment level in more than 30 years – 4.3 per cent in 2007 (Kennedy 2007). These figures indicate that there is very little labor capacity left in the Australian labor market. An observation that can be summarized in the following proposition:

Proposition 1: Sustained economic growth combined with an ageing population will cause a labor supply problem for the Australian economy and Australian Recruitment Industry.

Cost minimization and outsourcing. Transaction cost economics argues that a firm can recruit workers without the help of agencies, however, the cost of searching, negotiating, drafting the contract and monitoring would be much higher. The benefit of using agencies is that they can attract a pool of workers and a pool of firms, which allows them to transform labor supply irregularities into a permanent demand and supply business (Koene Paauwe & Groenewegen 2004).

The problem with outsourcing recruitment is that it was traditionally performed in a decentralized manner. In the traditional paradigm, line managers were given full authority to engage with agencies on an ad-hoc or relational basis. As a consequence, firm line managers developed close business and personal ties with several agencies (Stanworth & Druker 2006). An arrangement that worked well but was nonetheless quite costly for the firm to maintain – more suppliers creates more administration, which equals more bureaucratic costs. In an attempt to rein in that cost (and also driven by the quality standards imposed by ISO 9000 certification), firms attempted to centralize outsourced recruitment services. This was done by implementing preferred supplier or managed vendor agreements. Under this regime, line managers were ordered to sever established ties with agencies and to establish new ties with preferred suppliers or managed vendors. In a case study analysis of the implementation of recruitment services within a UK bank, Stanworth & Druker (2006) found that typically a contract was negotiated centrally by Human Resources, and then imposed on firm managers – ‘the manager was told that this is who you deal with and this is how the system works – follow it’ (2006: 185). In effect, such contracts establish a dual control regime between manager and agency by removing some of the hiring discretion from line managers. An observation that can be summarized in the following proposition:

Proposition 2: The imposition of the preferred supplier or managed service contracts on client firm line managers will create psychological resistance in these managers.

The Consequences of Opportunism in the Recruitment Industry

The effects of a skills shortage combined with the client firm's imperative to minimize costs on relationship and partnership satisfaction are unknown. To date, there has been no research on this topic. The following section is therefore conceptual in nature. It predicts the effects of breaking one component of interpersonal and inter-organizational ties – trust, as happens when the client firm orders its line managers to sever ties with labor suppliers.

Based on prior research, we know that tie strengths between two people or two organizations are based on a combination of the 'amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy and the reciprocal services, which characterize the tie' (Granovetter 1973: 1361). Ties, in an inter-firm context, are bonds that form between managers in different organizations. These bonds often take years to develop (Granovetter 1973). For example, trust is an affective and cognitive bond between individuals and organizations that emerges under conditions of continuous repeated exchange (Gulati 1995), as long as the buyer's purchasing routines are predictable and consistent and the buyer does not switch business to competitors (Butler 1991; Heidi & Miner 1992). From that perspective, a trustful relationship cannot happen overnight. It evolves gradually over time through repeated successful interactions (Gulati 1995). This is almost always the case in the recruitment industry, as recruitment firms cannot rely on reputation-based trust – a key element of fast trust (Perks & Halliday 2003). Recruitment firms have traditionally been associated with negative practices and underhanded deals. A major implication of this is that creating trust is a time consuming and expensive process requiring significant investments (Jaeger 1983; Ouchi 1980; Ring & Van de Ven 1992). This bond cannot be erased by the stroke of a pen or by senior management decree. Since trust is often interpersonally based and difficult to create, one can predict that line managers within client firms will resist breaking established relationships. Opportunism, in this case, would manifest itself in the rejection of the preferred supplier or managed vendor agreement, in favor of the maintenance of existing inter-firm relationships. It would also manifest itself as non-compliance with the terms and conditions of the preferred supplier or managed service agreement. An observation that can be summarized in the following proposition:

Proposition 3: Opportunism in the recruitment industry manifests itself as the rejection of the preferred supplier or managed vendor agreement, in favor of existing inter-firm relationships.

The result of non-compliance, for the agency, is a loss of income. Preferred supplier agreements and partnership agreements are signed under the explicit understanding that the client firm will order staff in bulk. In exchange, agencies agree to substantially lower their fees – low fees in return for exclusivity (Druker & Stanworth 2001). Agencies lose income when they do not get the volume orders, as stipulated in the contract, and also when they receive a lower level of income per unit sold.

OPTIONS TO RESOLVE THE OPPORTUNISM PROBLEM

There are two ways to remedy the opportunism problem in the recruitment industry. First, the agency can redefine (control) what constitutes labor and second the agency can control its partner.

Controlling the Labor Supply

Australian employment agencies are in a position to improve the labor supply to their clients provided they are aware of the current and anticipated labor market conditions and can adapt to them. Agency innovation can encourage change in clients, which will help them adapt to new labor market conditions, improve retention and productivity through on going training and assist the orderly transfer of knowledge as the baby boomers retire. Traditionally governments promote labor supply increases in two ways - through increased immigration and increased participation in the workforce.

Immigration. It is not possible to substantially affect population ageing by increasing immigration (Henry 2004). Australian skilled workers are also in the global labor market and the number of skilled immigrants and the number of skilled Australians permanently moving overseas balances out overall (Rolland 2004). However, to meet continued growth, Australia has substantially increased its level of immigration, particularly of skilled workers. In 2005-06 Australia increased the number of its

permanent immigrants by 70 per cent over a decade earlier to 180,000 (ABS 2007e). At the same time it altered the proportions of types of permanent immigrants, increasing the number of skilled migrants from 23 per cent of the total in 1996-97 (24,000 people) to 51 per cent of a larger number in 2005-06 (92,000 people). Via lobbying, the recruitment industry can influence the Federal Government to increase the total number of skilled migrants entering the country. An increase of say 20 percent, above current levels, should alleviate some of the labor shortages in the Australian economy.

Participation. The participation rate represents the proportion of people of working age (15 to 64 years) who are in work or actively seeking it. Australia's national participation rate was fairly stable over the 1990s at about 63.5 per cent although since 2004 it has increased significantly to 65 per cent. The recent growth in participation reflects three significant developments – a continuing growth in female participation aged between 25 and 54 years (largely in part-time employment); a leveling off in the decline in male participation; and a rise in participation of people aged 55 years or more (Betts, Connolly & Orsmond 2007). Different age groups and genders within the workforce have different levels of participation and the lower ones – males aged 24- 44, women with children and mature workers (45 years and more) are all seen as targets for greater employment (Abhayaratna & Lattimore 2006).

Mature workers. Of the total number of people in the workforce in 2006 aged 45 years or more (3.4 million) 90 per cent of them have indicated they intend to retire although more than 384,000 people have said they will never give up work (ABS 2007b). However, almost half (47 per cent) did not know at what age they would retire. The largest group of those who estimated their retirement (39 per cent) planned to do so when they were aged between 65 and 69 years. Thirty one per cent planned to retire aged 60-64 years and 19 per cent when they were aged 55 to 59 years (ABS 2007a). The average age was 63 years for men and 61 years for women.

Australian policy makers have been actively promoting the retention of mature workers (45 to 64 years) in employment since the International Year of Older Persons in 1999 with the introduction of a National Strategy for an Ageing Australia (Bishop 1999) and the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Employment, Education and Workplace Relations report (2000). It is important for the

recruitment industry to actively support these government initiatives through the creation of company policies that encourage the recruitment, selection and retention of mature age workers. Support for these policies will provide an additional and growing source of skilled workers for the Australian economy.

Controlling the Partner

While some researchers promote the use of contractual controls (outcome, behavioral and contracts) to resolve the problem of opportunism (Williamson 1985) and stabilize the relationship (Kale, Singh & Perlmutter 2000; Osborn & Baughn 1990), others promote the role of social controls (norms, values and cultures) (Kale et al. 2000; Zaheer & Venkatraman 1995).

Outcome control. The agency/outsourcing literature does discuss outcome controls; however, the discussion is restricted to outcome controls imposed by client firms on agencies (Conklin 2005). There are no studies detailing outcome controls imposed by agencies on client firms. This may be due to the fact that most agencies do not have the power to impose their will on client firms (Theodore & Peck 2002). However, there may be some notable exceptions to this rule. An agency engaged in a managed vendor partnership is likely to have some influence over the client firm's performance targets and goals. Managed vendor partnerships are single source agreements requiring client firms to outsource the entire recruitment function. In such partnerships, agencies may have the ability to set some client firm performance targets and goals. However, the situation may be different in preferred supplier agreements (Druker & Stanworth 2001). The multi-sourcing nature of these agreements prevents any single agency from having the power to alter client firm performance targets or goals.

Behavior control. Agencies are unlikely to have the power to set behavior controls for client firms. However, there may be some notable exceptions to this rule. An agency engaged in a managed vendor partnership may have some influence over the client firm's behavior control mechanisms, e.g. reporting and checking devices, accounting system, cost control system, quality control system and legal system (Das & Teng 1998). The nature of these relationships, mostly on-site, requires agency and client to

synchronize many aspects of operations, including planning and standard operating procedures. Managed vendors may even be able to take legal action against the client for breach of contract. Of course, such a breach would have to be severe. Conversely, an agency engaged in a preferred supplier agreement is unlikely to have the ability to influence the client's behavior control mechanisms. The multi-sourcing nature of these agreements will prevent the agency from modifying the client's behavior control mechanisms.

Contracts. Research conducted on the recruitment industry confirms that commercial contracts are found in almost all relationships and partnerships in the recruitment industry, whether dealing with preferred supplier relationships or managed vendor partnerships (Druker & Stanworth 2001; Koene et al. 2004; Purcell & Purcell 1999). However, the problem with this research is that it addresses the content of the contract, not its enforceability. It assumes that contracts are enforceable in this industry but does not empirically confirm it. In all likelihood, degree of enforceability is a key factor separating preferred supplier contracts and a managed vendor contracts. Although managed vendor partnerships are considered to be stronger than preferred supplier agreements both these relationships are quite weak. The power discrepancy between agency and client in both managed vendor partnerships and preferred supplier agreements makes it very difficult for the agency to take legal action against a client firm.

Culture. In any partnership, the management of organizational culture presents a particularly difficult challenge. The challenge centers on making cultural blending work, while largely preserving a separate identity (Das & Teng 1998). This is particularly important when the agency is engaged in a managed vendor partnership with the client firm but less important when the agency is engaged in a preferred supplier agreement. In a managed vendor partnership, agency staffs interact with client firm staff on a daily basis. One can conceptualize that, under those circumstances, agency staffs influence the client firm's culture while simultaneously being influenced by the client firm's culture. Conversely, culture is unlikely to be important in preferred supplier agreements. In preferred supplier agreements, agencies are required to work closely with client firm staff. However, these agencies are not located on site, which prevents them from having the ability to influence the client firm's culture to achieve agency goals.

Norms. There is no literature on norms between agencies and client firms, however, one can conceptualize that norms are likely to be highly important in controlling action in managed vendor partnerships but less important in preferred supplier agreements. They are important in managed services because these partnerships are in-house. In these partnerships, agency staffs have some measure of influence on the client's expectations and standards. Expectations and standards form the backbone of norms in inter-firm relationships (Heide & John 1992; Macneil 1980; Poppo & Zenger 2002). Conversely, norms are less likely to be important in preferred supplier agreements. They are less likely to be important because these agreements do not involve daily interaction between agency and client. Since the blending of staffs from the two organizations does not occur, staffs from both organizations can operate under a different set of standards without affecting the relationship.

Trust. Previous research on the outsourcing of recruitment services tends to highlight the importance of trust (Adler 2003; Conklin 2005; Dasborough & Sue-Chan 2002; Gardner 2005), however, this evidence far from conclusive. The little empirical research completed on trust between agencies and clients tends to downplay the role of client-based trust. From the client's perspective, the relationship between labor provider and client is not one requiring high levels of trust, since there is no long term commitment by the client and little evidence of shared investment in work processes or systems (Druker & Stanworth 2001). The evidence gathered from the client's perspective can be contrasted with the agency's perspective. Unlike clients, agencies are quite keen to portray the relationship between themselves and the client as one requiring high trust and quality of service. Branch representatives will often visit client firms at their premises to develop personal contacts (Druker & Stanworth 2001). Based on the evidence, it is difficult to ascertain the importance of trust in the agency/client relationship.

DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

This paper investigated the antecedents, consequences and implications of opportunism in the Australian recruitment industry. First, the discussion began with a definition of opportunism. For the purposes of this article, opportunism was defined as a manager's violation of their expected role behavior. The argument

put forth was that managers violate their role behavior when they don't follow directives from superiors. In the context of client firm/agency relationship such violation manifests itself as non-compliance to the terms and conditions of the supplier agreement. Second, based on a conceptual analysis of the industry, this paper demonstrated that opportunism, in the recruitment industry, was caused by the ageing of the population combined with strong economic growth and the firm's imperative to minimize cost. Third, this paper predicted the consequences of opportunism on the agency and client firm. It predicted that the skills shortage combined with the imposition of the supplier agreements would lead client firm managers to resist the imposition of these agreements. Managers resist this imposition by refusing to sever pre-established relationships with suppliers. Fourth, this paper discussed the implications of opportunism for the recruitment industry. The implications of this problem for the recruitment industry are severe. Over the next 5-20 years the recruitment industry will face a supply problem that it is not prepared to handle. This problem will place significant pressure on the stability of inter-organizational relationships in this industry. Last, this paper offered some practical solutions to resolve the opportunism problem. Two broad sets of solutions were put forward. The first solution involved agencies broadening their definition of employee. Agencies may also lobby government to increase immigration and participation. The second option requires agencies to tighten compliance to the preferred supplier or partnership agreement. As demonstrated in the paper the problem is choice - to choose the right combination of control mechanisms for the relationship - to combine each control mechanisms so it positively affects the behavior of client firms without damaging the relationship.

REFERENCES

Australian Bureau of Statistics (2005) *2005 Year Book Australia - 1301.0. Australian Bureau of Statistics*, Canberra.

Australian Bureau of Statistics (2007a) *Australian National Accounts: National Income, Expenditure and Product Sept 2007 - 5206.0. Australian Bureau of Statistics*, Canberra.

Australian Bureau of Statistics (2007b) *2007 Year Book Australia - 1301.0. Australian Bureau of Statistics*, Canberra.

Australian Bureau of Statistics (2007c) *Census of population and housing: Media release and fact sheets 2006. Australian Bureau of Statistics*, Canberra.

Australian Bureau of Statistics (2007d) *Labour Force, Australia, November 2007 -6202.0. Australian bureau of Statistics*, Canberra.

Australian Bureau of Statistics (2007e) *Australian Social Trends 2007, Migration: permanent additions to Australia's population – 4102.0. Australian Bureau of Statistics*, Canberra.

Abhayaratna J & Lattimore R (2006) *Workforce participation rates – how does Australia compare?* Productivity Commission Staff Working Paper, Canberra CA.

Adler P (2003) Making the HR outsourcing decision, *MIT Sloan Management Review* 45(1): 53-60

Betts T Connolly E & Orsmond D (2007) Trends in employment and labour supply, *Bulletin* September 2007: 1-7.

Bishop B (1999) Employment for mature age workers. Issue paper. The National Strategy for an Ageing Australia, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra CA.

Conklin D (2005) Risk and rewards in HR Business Process Outsourcing, *Long Range Planning* 38: 579-598.

Cully M Woodland S O'Reilly A & Dix G (1999) *Britain at Work, as Depicted by the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey*. Routledge, London.

Das TK & Teng B (1998) Between trust and control: Developing confidence in partner cooperation in alliances, *Academy of Management Review* 23: 491-512.

Dasborough M & Sue-Chan C (2002) The role of transaction costs and institutional forces in the outsourcing of recruitment, *Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources* 40: 306-321.

Davidov G (2004) Joint employer status in triangular employment relationships, *British Journal of Industrial Relations* 42: 727-746.

Druker J & Stanworth C (2001) Partnership and the private recruitment industry, *Human Resources Management Journal* 11(2): 73-89.

Forde C & Slater G (2006) The nature of agency working in Britain: What are the challenges for human resources management? *Personnel Management* 35: 141-157

Gardner T (2005) Human resources alliances: defining the construct and exploring the antecedents, *International Journal of Human Resources Management* 16: 1049-1066

Granovetter M (1973) The strength of weak ties, *American Journal of Sociology* 78(6): 1360-80.

Gulati R (1995) Does familiarity breed trust? The implications of repeated ties for contractual choice in alliances, *Academy of Management Journal* 38(1): 85-112.

Hall R (2002) *Labour hire in Australia: Motivation, dynamics and prospects*. Paper presented at the Conference on Temporary Agency Employment, Newcastle.

Heide J & John G (1992) Do norms matter in marketing relationships? *Journal of Marketing*, 56: 32–44.

Henry K (2004) An ageing population and the challenge for Australia's living standards and public policy, *Growth* 51: 11-20.

Jaeger AM (1983) The transfer of organizational culture overseas: an approach to control in the multinational corporation, *Journal of International Business Studies* 14(2): 91-114.

John G (1984) An Empirical Investigation of Some Antecedents of Opportunism in a Marketing Channel, *Journal of Marketing Research* 21: 278-89.

Kale P Singh H & Perlmutter H (2000) Learning and protection of proprietary assets in strategic alliances: building relational capital, *Strategic Management Journal* 21:217–37

Kennedy S (2007) *Full employment in Australia and the implications for policy*. Unpublished speech. The NSW Economic Society, Australia.

Koene B Paauwe J & Groenewegen J (2004) Understanding the development of temporary agency work in Europe, *Human Resource Management Journal*, 14(3): 53-73.

Lanza B Maryn M & Elders R (2003) Legal status of contingent workers, *Compensation and Benefits Review* July/August: 47-60.

Macneil IR 1980. *The New Social Contract: An Inquiry into Modern Contractual Relations*. Yale University Press, California.

Osborn R & Baughn C (1990) Forms of inter-organizational governance for multinational alliances, *Academy of Management Journal* 33: 503-519.

Ouchi WG (1980) Markets, bureaucracies, and clans, *Administrative Science Quarterly* 25(1): 120–142.

Perks H Halliday S (2003) Sources, signs and signaling for fast trust creation in organizational relationships, *European management journal* 21, 338-350.

Poppo L & Zenger T (2002) Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes or complements? *Strategic Management Journal* 23: 707-725.

Purcell J Purcell K & Tailby S (2004) Temporary work agencies: Here today, gone tomorrow, *British journal of industrial relations* 42: 705-725.

- Ring P & Van de Ven A (1992) Structuring cooperative relationships between organizations, *Strategic Management Journal* 13(1): 483–498.
- Robinson S & Bennett R (1995) A typology of deviant workplace behaviors: a multi-dimensional scaling study, *Academy of Management Journal* 38: 555-572.
- Rolland L (2004) The shifting profile of labour supply, *Growth* 51: 58-65.
- Stanworth C & Druker J (2006) Human resource solutions? Decisions of employers' use of temporary agency labour in the UK, *Personnel Review* 35(2): 175-190.
- Theodore N & Peck J (2002) The temporary staffing industry: Growth imperatives and limits to contingency, *Economic Geography* 78(4): 463-493.
- Ward K (2004) Going global? Internationalization and diversification in the temporary staffing industry, *Economic Geography* 4(3): 251-273.
- Webster FE (1992) The changing role of marketing in the corporation, *Journal of Marketing* 56(4): 1-17.
- Williamson OE (1985) *The Economic Institutions of Capitalism*. Free Press, New York.
- Zaheer A & Venkatraman N (1995) Relational governance as an inter-organizational strategy: an empirical test of the role of trust in economic exchange, *Strategic Management Journal* 16: 373– 92.