The Effect of Corporate Activism on Employee Motivation:

Field Experimental Evidence from Online Labor Market Platforms

Abstract

Though there has been a recent surge in corporate activism, with firm leaders communicating stances on social-political issues not directly related to their core businesses, we know little about its strategic implications. This paper examines the effect of an employer taking a stance about a prevalent social-political issue – climate change – on employee motivation and performance, using two field experiments in online labor market platforms. It demonstrates that the effects of taking a stance vary depending on whether the employee agrees or disagrees with the stance, and demonstrates a strong *de-motivating* effect of taking a stance that employees *disagree* with, and no *motivating* effect of taking a stance that employees *agree* with. The demotivating effect appears to be driven by employees feeling that the employer does not share their same values and beliefs, and that they do not identify with their employer. This study has important implications for the nascent scholarship on corporate activism, as well as the scholarship on strategic human capital management.

1. Introduction

There has been a surge in corporate activism, or corporate social advocacy, in recent years, wherein firm leaders communicate stances on social-political issues not directly related to their core business (Chatterji and Toffel 2016, 2017, Dodd and Supa 2014). This includes twelve CEOs signing a letter to Texas Senator Greg Abbott against LGBTQ discriminatory legislation in May 2017, the CEO of Chick-fil-A making anti-same-sex-marriage statements in public interviews

starting in 2011, and a number of Silicon Valley CEOs making strong moral opposition statements regarding President Trump's immigration policy on Twitter, social media platforms, and in public interviews.[1] CEOs have made statements, both for and against, issues including climate change, gay marriage and transgender equality matters, racial issues, gun control, gender equality, healthcare, and immigration. These are issues that were once exclusively the domain of politicians, NGOs, and advocacy groups (Chatterji and Toffel 2016).

Despite the increasing prevalence of employers taking stands on social-political issues, we know little about the strategic implications of doing so. Scholars have only recently begun to examine the impact of corporate activism on stakeholders whose perceptions and behavior are critical to firm success, with Chatterji and Toffel's (2017) work examining the influence of CEO activism on consumers and the public, and Dodd and Supa's (2014) study of the effects of corporate social advocacy on consumer intent to purchase. To my knowledge, this is the first paper to examine the effect of communicating an employer's stance about a social-political issue on employee motivation or performance.

I implemented randomized field experiments on Upwork and Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), two online labor market platforms, to study a causal effect of an employer taking a stance about a social-political issue – climate change – on employee motivation. In each study, once workers were hired for short-term jobs, I randomly assigned whether or not they received information about their employer's intention to take a stance on President Trump's climate change policy. I then observed the effect of these stance "treatments" on workers' performance on the job – in particular, their willingness to do extra work unrequired for payment.

[1] https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/30/big-companies-defy-trump-on-climate-change.html

Numerous attributes of the online labor marketplace settings make them valuable as field experimental settings to study the relationships of interest. First, workers complete their work online and without interacting with each other. This reduces the likelihood of treatment-effect diffusion from the treatment groups to the control group. Second, a researcher can randomly assign information about the (fictitious) employer, keeping all other potentially confounding factors that could influence worker behavior constant. Since there is no information about the employer's stance on the social-political issue available on the Internet or elsewhere, this ensures that workers' perceptions of a well-known firm's or CEO's political ideology cannot be influenced by information outside of the researcher's control. (For example, workers would not find out anything about their employer's political ideology by googling the name). This also ensures that a worker's preconceived notions about the employer's stance on the issue do not confound the results. The use of these research settings thus avoids many of the internal validity challenges that would afflict similarly designed field experiments implemented with a well-known company (Burbano 2016). There has been increasing interest in conducting field experiments within strategy research (Chatterji et al. 2016), and a critical component to these natural field experiments (List 2009) is that the workers complete their work in their real-world work context and are never made aware of their participation in a study. Furthermore, by conducting similar field experiments in two separate online labor marketplace settings, each with complementary pros and cons, I bring additional robustness to my findings.

In the Upwork study, workers who were informed about their employer's intention to take a stance on the issue of climate change and who *disagreed* with their employer's stance completed 81% less extra optional work than workers whose employers did not take a stance (the control group), while workers who *agreed* with their employer's stance completed a statistically

equivalent amount of optional work to those whose employers did not take a stance. The AMT study showed similar results, with workers who were informed about their employer's intention to take a stance on the issue of climate change and who *disagreed* with that stance completing 33% less optional work than the control group, and workers who *agreed* with the stance completing a statically equivalent amount of optional work as the control group, whose employers did not take a stance. I thus find there to be a *demotivating* effect of an employer taking a political stance on an issue about which its employees *disagree*, but no *motivational* effect of an employer taking a political stand on an issue about which its employees *agree*. This suggests that corporate activism, from an employee stakeholder management perspective, is a riskier action than might have been realized to be to date. The AMT study further demonstrates that the demotivating effect appears to be driven by employees feeling that their employer does not share their same values and beliefs, and not identifying with their employer.

This paper contributes directly to the nascent literature on the strategic implications of corporate political activism (Chatterji and Toffel 2016, 2017, Dodd and Supa 2014) and indirectly to the related, but distinct, scholarship on the influence of CEO political ideology, shown to influence the activist behavior of employees (Briscoe et al. 2014) and corporate social performance (Chin et al. 2013). This paper is, to my knowledge, the first to consider the effects of an employer taking a stand on a social-political issue on employee motivation and performance. This paper's findings suggest that, from a strategic human capital perspective (Campbell et al. 2012a, 2012b, Coff 1997, Foss and Lindenberg 2013, Huselid et al. 1997, Koch and McGrath 1996), the costs of taking a social-political stance that goes against that of a company's employees are greater than the benefits of taking a social-political stance that is in line with that of a company's employees. The results of this paper also highlight the risks of having an employee population that does not

share the social-political values of the CEO and firm, in line with the scholarship that has shown the benefits of value congruence between employees and the firm more broadly (e.g., Cable and Edwards 2004, Edwards and Cable 2009). Given the setting of the field experiments, this paper also has implications for the emerging scholarship on motivating workers in the "gig" or "virtual" economy (Martins et al. 2004, Sundararajan 2016). From a practical perspective, these findings suggest that managers should be aware of whether their employees agree or disagree with the social-political issue in consideration, and should be wary of taking a stance on social-political issues that are at odds with those of their employees.

2. Literature and Theory

2.1 Corporate Political Activism

Corporate political activism is considered to be theoretically distinct from nonmarket strategy (Chatterji and Toffel 2017) – in which firms work to influence government policies that are related to their core businesses (Baron 1995, Bonardi et al. 2006, Baron 2012) – because the link between the social issue and the corporation's core business objectives is unclear. It is also outside of the realm of what scholars have traditionally considered to be corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Chatterji and Toffel 2017).Whereas CSR is generally accepted to be "doing good," with the debate on CSR centered more around whether this behavior is strategic for firms and benefits the bottom line (Margolis et al. 2009, Margolis and Walsh 2001) and whether it is optimal compared to an alternative arrangement (Kaul and Luo 2017), the corporate activist behavior that has been on the rise in recent years is not universally agreed upon to be "doing good." This is reflected in the fact that CEOs and corporations have at times taken directly opposing stands

on the same issue.[2] Thus, existing scholarship on the strategic implications of CSR and nonmarket strategy stops short of predicting the effects of this distinct type of corporate behavior. Indeed, we know very little about the strategic implications of corporate political activism and its influence on critical stakeholders (Chatterji and Toffel 2016, 2017, Dodd and Supa 2014), including its influence on employee motivation and performance.

2.2 Corporate Political Activism and Employee Willingness to do Extra Work

Applications of the person-organization fit and value congruence literature, as well as social identity theory, suggest that an employer taking a stance on a contentious social issue should influence an employee's perceptions of and satisfaction in working for an employer. The organizational behavior literature examining the drivers of what has been called "prosocial organizational behavior" or "organizational citizenship behavior" links such perceptions and job satisfaction to an important type of worker performance – a willingness to go above and beyond what is contractually required, including a willingness to do extra work. Taken together, this suggests that an employer taking a political stand on a social issue should influence workers' willingness to do extra work, with the direction of this influence depending on whether the stance is in line with the employee's own values.

Value congruence between an employee and an employing firm refers to the compatibility between the values and norms of an employee and those of the employer (Chatman 1989). Critical to person-organization fit (Kristof-Brown et al. 2005), value congruence has been shown to influence important outcomes such as employee wellbeing (O'Reilly et al. 1991), employee

[2] For example, while Chick-fil-A CEO Dan Cathy has stated opposition to gay marriage (Dodd and Supa 2014), Marc Benioff, CEO of Salesforce, is a leading spokesperson amongst executives against anti-LGBT legislation (Steinmetz 2016).

creativity (Spanjol et al. 2015), and positive attitudes towards the job and employer (Kristof-Brown et al. 2005). Indeed, an employee will more favorably consider the qualities of his or her employer when those qualities are in line with his or her values. When an employee favorably compares an employer's qualities to those of others, his or her self-image increases (Ashforth and Mael 1989, Dutton and Dukerich 1991, Brockner et al. 2014). Higher self-image and self-concept increase the attractiveness of categorizing oneself as part of an organization and thus, increase organizational identification, as well as job satisfaction (Ashforth and Mael 1989, Brockner et al. 2014, Dutton and Dukerich 1991, Dutton et al. 1994, Greening and Turban 2000, Mael and Ashforth 1992). Indeed, person-organization fit has been shown to positively influence organizational identification (Edwards and Cable 2009, O'Reilly et al. 1991). Correspondingly, a decrease in perceived person-organization fit or perceived value congruence on the part of the employee should negatively influence organizational identification and job satisfaction.

Organizational identification (Bateman and Organ 1983, Illies et al. 2006, O'Reilly and Chatman 1986, Organ and Ryan 1995) in turn is a driver of an important type of employee performance: a willingness to go above and beyond what is formally required by the job or contract – sometimes called "organizational citizenship behavior" (OCB) (e.g., Morrison 1994, Organ 1988) or "prosocial organizational behavior" (e.g., Brief and Motowidlo 1986). OCB includes taking on additional assignments, voluntarily assisting others at work, and otherwise going above and beyond what is formally required by the job (Bolino and Turnley 2003). It has been shown to be critical for organizational effectiveness (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). Indeed, person-organization fit has been shown to influence positive citizenship behaviors such as supporting the organization's mission and putting in extra effort (Arthur et al. 2006, Kristof-Brown et al. 2005, Kristof-Brown and Guay 2011).

Taken together, I would expect an employer taking a stance on a social-political issue to influence employees' perceptions about value congruence and identification with their employer, depending on whether the employee agrees with the stance. In turn, this should influence their willingness to complete extra work. Thus, I would expect the effect on employee willingness to complete extra work for the employer to be positive if the employee agrees with the employer's social-political stance, and negative if the employee disagrees with the employer's social-political stance.

3. Empirical Settings

I implement field experiments on the online labor marketplaces Upwork and Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) to examine a causal effect of an employer taking a political stance for or against a social-political issue – President Trump's position on climate change – on workers' willingness to do extra work beyond what is required in their contract.

Upwork is one of the most commonly used online labor marketplaces. Approximately 12 million freelancers use its platform to find jobs, with 5 million employers seeking on-demand talent on the site.[3] Upwork workers are more educated than the average U.S. freelancer, with 77% holding a college degree.[4] Typical jobs take days or weeks to complete, and payment amounts are in the tens or hundreds of dollars. They include such categories as IT and programming, administrative support, design and multimedia, and even engineering and manufacturing. The average hourly wage for U.S. freelancers on Upwork is $28, which translates into an annual income of $56,000 (Eha 2013) – comparable to the average annual U.S. household income.

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[3] Alexia Elejalde-Ruiz, "Freelance marketplace Upwork opens Chicago office, expects staff of 100." Chicago Tribune. August 2, 2017. http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-upwork-chicago-office-freelancer-economy-0802-biz-2-20170801-story.html

[4] Pawel Popiel, "'Boundaryless'" in the creative economy: assessing freelancing on Upwork." Critical Studies in Media Communication Vol 34, 2017, available at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15295036.2017.1282618

AMT jobs, called HITs (an acronym for human intelligence tasks), typically take only a few minutes to complete, with more complex or time-consuming tasks broken into a series of smaller HITs. Typical jobs include simple data entry and survey completion. The average effective wage of an AMT worker is $4.80 per hour (Mason and Suri 2012). A benefit of the AMT setting is that it is possible to gather a large sample and, because completion of surveys is common on AMT, it is also a natural context in which to ask questions to begin to study the mechanisms driving results. A downside of the AMT setting is that jobs are very short and remuneration is small, making generalizability more challenging. A benefit of the Upwork setting is that jobs are longer, for higher pay, and are thus more representative of gig and corporate work. A tradeoff of the Upwork setting is that it is uncommon to attract or hire hundreds of workers for the same job (which is common on AMT), resulting in a smaller sample size. Surveys are also rarely administered on Upwork as part of a job requirement, so to keep the job typical of other Upwork jobs, I limited the number of survey questions administered at the end of the job and did not require workers to answer these questions (completion of the survey was optional); as a result, some control variables are missing for observations from the Upwork study, but not for the AMT study.

By implementing field experiments in both settings, I increase the robustness and generalizability of my main results, drawing from Chatterji et al. (2016), who emphasize the value of replicating field experiments in different settings when possible. In what follows, I describe the Upwork experimental design and results, followed by those of the AMT field experiment. IRB approval was obtained for each.

4. Upwork Field Experiment

4.1. Field Experiment Design (Upwork)

Acting as a hiring firm, I advertised a job on Upwork: Translation from English to Spanish.[5] The job was to translate one page of text from English to Spanish, corresponding to 567 words of translation, for payment of $10. The job description indicated that the employer was looking to translate numerous documents of multiple pages each, and was looking to hire numerous Upworkers to get the job done relatively quickly. Interested applicants submitted a proposal on the Upwork website. All workers who submitted complete proposals and were willing to accept the offered payment amount for the job (i.e., who submitted bid amounts of $10 or lower) were hired. After being hired, all workers received a message via the Upwork communication portal that included their instructions for the job, namely to translate the first page of a document from English to Spanish. It was noted that if they were willing to translate more than the first page of the attached document (the total document was 10 pages), this would be helpful for the employer, but that doing so was not required to receive full payment, nor would it influence their feedback ratings.[6] All workers received the same document to translate, though they were not aware of this.

The workers were randomly assigned to one of three conditions and, according to their condition, received additional information along with their job instructions.[7] The three conditions were (1) an *Agree with Trump's Stance on Climate Change* condition that received information that the company would be releasing a statement supporting President Trump's decision to

[5] IRB approval was obtained. The study took place in August 2017. The name of the fictitious firm is available from the author upon request.

[6] All workers received these job instructions: "Attached is the document we would like for you to translate from English to Spanish. You are only required to translate the first page of this document from English to Spanish, though if you are willing to translate more than the first page of the attached document, that would be helpful for us. The more pages that we can translate as rapidly (and accurately) as possible, the more satisfied our client will be. We would appreciate any additional sentences or paragraphs translated beyond the required first page (approx. 500 words), but please note that it is not required to receive full payment for your services (and will not influence your feedback rating, nor the likelihood of hiring your services again in the future, which we will base on the required work we are hiring you for). Please send us your final product within a week from today. If you need a time extension on the deadline, let us know."

[7] Random assignment was implemented using a random number generator in Excel, where each of the three conditions was assigned a corresponding number.

withdraw from the Paris Agreement, and that the CEO agrees with President Trump's view on climate change; (2) a *Disagree with Trump's Stance on Climate Change* condition that received information that the company would be releasing a statement denouncing President Trump's decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, and that the CEO does not agree with President Trump's view on climate change; and (3) a *Control* condition that received generic information about the employer (that the company would be changing its name, and that the CEO decided to add the ending "Incorporated" to the company name).[8] See Figure 1 for the messages corresponding to each condition.

Workers completed the job within a week, and submitted their final work product (the translated document) via Upwork. Upon completion of the job, all workers were paid through the Upwork payment system. After payment was administered, workers were asked to complete an optional survey to provide the employer additional information about the pool of Upwork workers.

Insert Figure 1 about here

4.2. Sample and Randomization Balance (Upwork)

One hundred and sixty individuals submitted proposals for the job within the one week time frame during which the job was posted, and the 123 who met the qualifications for the job were offered the job.[9] One hundred and eighteen individuals accepted the job and were hired. Eight of these workers dropped out of the job after random assignment of conditions.[10] The resulting

[8] The conditions were designed to be similar in length, and all reference the CEO by design.
[9] All applicants who submitted a relevant cover letter and who were willing to accept the $10 offer for the job (i.e., who bid $10 or less for the job) were hired.
[10] Likelihood of completing the job after being hired was 0.88 for the control group, 0.94 for the treatment group whose employer denounced Trump's climate change policy, and 0.97 for the treatment group supporting Trump's climate change policy; $p = 0.3617$ and $p = 0.1304$, respectively, that the likelihood of completing the job for the respective treatment groups was statistically different from that of the control.

sample size is 110. Ninety-six of these workers who completed the job answered the optional survey questions after the job was completed.

Table 1 reports summary statistics for the sample, by condition. There were no statistically significant differences between the mean characteristics listed in Table 1 for the treatment and control groups except for income, the primary reason for completing jobs on Upwork being "the money I earn on Upwork is my primary source of income" and "it is a productive use of my free time," and agreement about President Trump's climate change policy. This suggests that randomization was generally successful and that selection bias due to observables is minimal.[11] Based on Upwork metrics, workers on average earned about $4,400 from previous Upwork jobs, charged $12.27 per hour, completed about 13 previous Upwork jobs, and bid on average $9.36 for the job.[12] Seventy-four percent of workers came from Latin and South America, 8% from Spain, 11% from the U.S., and 2% from other regions. Based on self-reported data gathered during the survey, 57% of the workers are women, and 65% have a B.A. degree or higher. Workers on average disagreed with President Trump's stance on climate change (average 5-point Likert scale response to "Do you agree with President Trump's current stance on climate change" was 4.33, between 4= "probably not" and 5= "definitely not").

4.3. Measures

Dependent Variable. *Number of optional words translated* is the number of unrequired extra words that were translated (i.e., the number of words translated above the required first page of words). Given that the outcome I am interested in capturing is the amount of (extra) effort the

[11] These are thus included as controls in the regression results presented in the Results section.
[12] Though the job was a fixed price at $10, some individuals bid lower amounts, presumably to increase their chances of being hired.

worker was willing to put forth for the employer, I also wanted to capture cases where the employee did less than the required amount of work; in cases where the individual translated less than the required number of words (567), *Number of optional words translated* is coded as a negative number equal to the number below the required number of words translated. The reported results are robust to the coding of these cases as 0 optional words, rather than a negative number of optional words.

Independent Variables. *Employer Supports Trump's CC Policy* is a variable coded 1 if the worker received information that the employer agrees with Trump's stance on climate change, and 0 if the worker was in the control group and received no information about the employer's stance. *Employer Denounces Trump's CC Policy* is a variable coded 1 if the worker received information that the employer disagrees with Trump's stance on climate change, and 0 if the worker was in the control group and received no information about the employer's stance. *Employer Takes Stance* is a variable coded 1 if the worker received information about the employer's stance on the issue of climate change (either in support of or against), and coded as 0 if the worker was in the control group and did not receive information about the employer's stance on the issue of climate change.

Control and Moderating Variables. Control variables which could intuitively influence a worker's willingness to complete extra work beyond what is included in the job contract were constructed from information self-reported by the applicants (income, gender, education, reason for completing work on Upwork) and from the Upwork proposal submissions (all other characteristics). *Female* is a dummy variable. *College degree* is a binary variable equal to 1 if the employee has at least a B.A. degree. *Bid amount* is a continuous variable indicating the amount bid, and thus paid, for the job. *Hourly rate* is a continuous variable for the hourly rate that the

employee generally charges on Upwork.) # *past Upwork jobs* equals the number of jobs the employee has completed on Upwork, including the current job. Indicator variables for the main reason for completing jobs on Upwork being *Upwork is my primary income* and *Upwork is a productive use of my free time* are included due to imperfect randomization of these characteristics across the treatment and control groups, as is *Opinion of Trump's CC Policy* (a continuous variable measured on a 5-point Likert scale) and *Income bracket*, an ordinal variable with the following values: 1 if household income in the previous year was less than $50,000, 2 if between $50,000 and $79,999, 3 if $90,000 or above.

A key moderating variable is whether or not the employee agrees with the stance taken by the employer. This variable was constructed using employees' self-reported agreement or disagreement with President Trump's climate change policy ("Do you agree with President Trump's current stance on climate change?" measured on a 5-point Likert scale). Employees had the option to answer, "I don't know what this is," in which case this variable was coded as missing. *Employee Agrees with Company* is comprised of individuals in Treatment Group A (employer denounces policy) whose response to whether they agree with Trump's climate change policy was "probably not" or "definitely not" and individuals in Treatment Group B (employer supports policy) whose response to whether they agree with Trump's climate change policy was "definitely yes" or "probably yes." *Employee Disagrees with Company* is comprised of individuals in Treatment Group B (employer supports policy) whose response to whether they agree with Trump's climate change policy was "probably not" or "definitely not" and individuals in Treatment Group A (employer denounces policy) whose response to whether they agree with Trump's climate change policy was "definitely yes" or "probably yes."

4.4. Results

Figure 2a presents the kernel density estimations for *Number of optional words translated* for the control and treatment groups. Given variation in employee agreement with the stances being taken by the employer, however, this high-level depiction of the treatment vs. control effects does not reflect the nuances of employees' differential responses to the treatments based on whether or not they agree with the stance taken by their employer. To reflect these differential effects, Figure 2b presents the kernel density estimations of *Number of optional words translated* for 1) the control group that received no information about the company's stance, 2) the group that received information about the company's stance and agreed with that stance, and 3) the group that received information about the company's stance and disagreed with that stance.

Insert Figures 2a and 2b here

To further examine the motivational effects of an employer taking a stance on a social-political issue while controlling for characteristics that were not perfectly randomized in the experiment, as well as for other employee-level characteristics likely to influence willingness to complete extra work, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results with robust standard errors are reported in Table 2. Columns 1 and 2 report the average treatment effects of the employer supporting Trump's climate change policy, and denouncing Trump's climate change policy, respectively, compared to the employer not taking a stance. Columns 3 and 4 add as controls those variables which were not properly randomized across conditions, and Columns 5 and 6 add additional control variables intuitively likely to influence workers' willingness to complete extra work (gender, college degree, bid amount, Upwork hourly rate, and number of past Upwork jobs). These regressions show that taking a stance in support of Trump's climate change policy had no (statistically significant) effect on the number of optional words translated; nor did taking a stance

against Trump's climate change policy. Income and bid amount were positively associated with number of optional words translated, while number of past Upwork jobs and increased agreement with Trump's climate change policy (measured on a Likert scale from 1 to 5) were associated with fewer optional words translated.

Insert Table 2 here

As employees are likely to vary in their agreement vs. disagreement with the stance taken, Table 3 examines the effect of the employer taking a stance compared to not taking a stance (i.e., the control group) on the number of unrequired words translated, depending on whether the employee agreed or disagreed with the employer's stance. As in Table 2, Columns 1 and 2 do not include any controls, Columns 3 and 4 include controls for variables that were not well-randomized, and Columns 5 and 6 add additional controls that could intuitively influence workers' willingness to complete extra work. Columns 1, 3, and 5 demonstrate that when the employer took a stance on the issue of climate change and the employee agreed with that stance, the number of optional words translated was not statistically different from that of the control group wherein the employer did not take a stance on the issue ($p > 0.10$). Negative in sign in Column 1, the coefficient is positive in Columns 3 and 5 with the inclusion of controls, which is in the direction we would expect; however, the effect compared to that of the control group on extra work completed is not statistically different from zero. In Columns 2, 4, and 6, we see that when the employer took a stance on an issue that was in disagreement with the employee's stance on the issue, the effect on number of optional words translated was negative. Translating an average of 381 less optional words compared to the control group, employees whose employers took a stance that they disagreed with completed 81% less optional translated words compared to employees whose employers did not take a stance (the control group). The magnitude of this effect is greater with

the inclusion of additional control variables in Columns 4 and 6, though the effect becomes only marginally significant ($p < 0.10$).

Insert Table 3 here

5. Field Experiment 2 (Amazon Mechanical Turk)

Certainly, a limitation of the study implemented in the Upwork setting is that the sample size is low. This is a natural result of the Upwork setting, in which individuals stop bidding and submitting proposals for a job that has already received a high number of proposals (since this information can be seen by prospective applicants) (Burbano 2016). This could result in my analyses being underpowered, making it possible that I observe a null effect when in fact a statistically significant effect exists. I thus ran a complementary study on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), which allows for a much larger sample size, to increase robustness of my findings. I used a different type of job to elicit willingness to complete extra work in the AMT setting, namely a data entry job, which is a very common job on AMT.

5.1. Field Experiment Design (AMT)

Acting as a firm, I advertised a data-gathering HIT on AMT for payment of $1.00 estimated to take under 10 minutes.[13] The payment amount, nature of the job, and description were, by design, constructed to be typical of other AMT jobs at the time. Only U.S.-based workers with a HIT approval rate of at least 90 were eligible for the job.[14] Hired workers were taken to an external survey site to complete the HIT. Workers were given detailed instructions for the job, which

[13] The job description was titled "Gather 10 data points from website and complete short survey." This study took place in December 2017. The fictitious name of the firm is available from the author upon request. IRB approval was obtained.

[14] A HIT approval rate of 90 is a common cutoff to ensure the work is of good quality.

consisted of gathering 10 data points from a website and completing a short survey. Workers were given a sample data-entry question and were instructed to enter an answer for feedback.[15] They were informed that their answer was being processed, and received an additional message corresponding to one of three randomly assigned conditions.[16] The *Agree with Trump's Stance on Climate Change* group received information that the company would be releasing a statement supporting President Trump's decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, and that the CEO agrees with President Trump's view on climate change; (2) a *Disagree with Trump's Stance on Climate Change* group received information that the company would be releasing a statement denouncing President Trump's decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, and that the CEO does not agree with President Trump's view on climate change; and (3) a *Control* group received generic information about the employer (that we would be changing our AMT requester name, at the recommendation of our CEO) (see Figure 3 for the exact messages).

Insert Figure 3 here

Workers received feedback about whether their answer to the sample question was correct and what the correct answer was. Workers were prompted to enter the 10 required data-entry points, and then were asked if they were willing to complete additional data-entry points, which were optional and not required for payment. Those willing were provided 30 more data-entry queries and could provide answers to none, some, or all of them. Workers were then surveyed to gather information on demographic and other characteristics, including their perceptions about Trump's climate change policy. They were paid at the end of the job.

[15] Sample question: "On 4/25/2014, what was the high stock price for General Electric (GE)?"
[16] We are processing your answer. Click on "continue" after the button appears at the bottom right of this page. This should take approximately 15 seconds. Thank you for your patience.

5.2. Sample

Nine hundred U.S.-based workers were recruited on AMT for this field experiment. Sixteen observations were dropped due to repeat IP addresses, suggesting that a worker may have participated in the experiment more than once; and 19 were dropped due to taking 5 minutes or less to complete the entire study. Fifty-three individuals who did not complete the HIT exited after the random assignment of conditions, and there was no statistically significant difference between the control and two treatment groups in likelihood of exiting.[17] This suggests that selection bias due to attrition is minimal. The resulting sample size is 865 workers.

Table 4 presents summary statistics for workers in the sample, by condition. Approximately half of the workers were female, the mean age was 35 years, and just over half of the workers had a college degree. Approximately 80 percent of the workers answered that the reason they complete HITs on MTurk is for the money earned from these HITs, as opposed to it being a productive use of free time or fun. This suggests that, although the payment amount received on AMT is low, the money earned on these HITs is important and relevant for these workers. There were no statistically significant differences ($p > 0.10$) between the mean characteristics listed in Table 4 for the treatment and control groups, except for the primary reason workers complete work on AMT, suggesting that randomization was successful and that selection bias due to observables is minimal.[18]

Insert Table 4 here

5.3. Measures

[17] Likelihood of not completing the entire job was 0.02 for the control group, 0.04 for the treatment group whose employer denounced Trump's climate change policy, and 0.02 for the treatment group whose employer supported Trump's climate change policy: $p = 0.1357$ and $p = 0.9342$ that the likelihood of exiting for the respective treatment groups was statistically different from that of the control.

[18] Primary reason for completing work on AMT is thus included in regression analyses reported in the Results section.

Dependent Variable. *Number of optional data points completed* is the number of optional data points (out of 30) that the worker completed.

Independent Variables. *Employer SupportsTrump's CC Policy* is a variable coded 1 if the worker received information that the employer agrees with Trump's stance on climate change, and 0 if the worker was in the control group and received no information about the employer's stance. *Employer Denounces Trump's CC Policy* is a variable coded 1 if the worker received information that the employer disagrees with Trump's stance on climate change, and 0 if the worker was in the control group and received no information about the employer's stance. *Employer Takes Stance* is a variable coded 1 if the worker received information about the employer's stance on the issue of climate change (either in support of or against), and coded 0 if the worker was in the control group and did not receive information about the employer's stance on the issue of climate change.

Control Variables. Control variables include demographic control variables, and AMT experience and performance control variables. *HIT approval rate* is a proxy for prior AMT performance and can take the values 90 – 100. *HITs per week* is a proxy for prior AMT experience and is an ordinal variable with the following values: 1 if the worker completed less than 10 HITs per week in the past month, 2 if the worker completed 10 to 49, 3 if the worker completed 50 to 100, and 4 if the worker complete more than 100. *Income bracket* is a categorical variable equal to 1 if annual household incomes are less than $50K, 2 if $50K-$80K, and 3 if greater than $80K. *Female* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the worker is female and 0 if the worker is male. *College degree* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the worker has at least a B.A. degree and 0 otherwise. *Age* is a continuous variable. Indicator variables for the primary reasons that work is completed on

AMT are included due to imperfect randomization of these characteristics across the treatment and control groups.

The moderating variable of whether or not the employee agrees with the stance taken by the employer was constructed using employees' self-reported agreement or disagreement with President Trump's climate change policy; namely, their response to "Do you agree with President Trump's current stance on climate change?", measured on a 7-point Likert scale. *Employee Agrees with Company* is comprised of individuals in Treatment Group A (employer denounces policy) whose response to whether they agree with Trump's climate change policy was "strongly disagree," "disagree," or "somewhat disagree," and individuals in Treatment Group B (employer supports policy) whose response to whether they agree with Trump's climate change policy was "strongly agree," "agree," or "somewhat agree." Those who answered "neither agree nor disagree" are coded as missing. *Employee Disagrees with Company* is comprised of individuals in Treatment Group B (employer supports policy) whose response to whether they agree with Trump's climate change policy was "strongly disagree," "disagree," or "somewhat disagree," and individuals in Treatment Group A (employer denounces policy) whose response to whether they agree with Trump's climate change policy was "strongly agree," "agree," or "somewhat agree." Those who answered "neither agree nor disagree" are coded as missing.[19] Likewise, employees had the option to answer, "I don't know what this is," in which case their response is coded as missing.[20]

Workers were asked to indicate their agreement on a 7-point Likert scale with the statements: "I feel that this employer shares my same values and beliefs" and "I identify with this employer" at the end of the survey. Workers' responses to these questions (as continuous variables)

[19] One hundred and thirty-three people answered that they "neither agree nor disagree" with President Trump's climate change policy. Results are robust to including these in either the agree or disagree categories, though the coefficient sizes decrease slightly.
[20] Thirty-four people responded that they did not know what this is.

are used to test the mechanisms through which taking a social-political stance influences willingness to complete extra work.

5.4. Results

5.4.1. Effect of Taking a Stance on Extra Work Completed

Figure 4a presents the kernel density estimations for *Number of optional data points completed* for the control and treatment groups, and Figure 4b presents the kernel density estimations of *Number of optional data points completed* for 1) the control group that received no information about the company's stance, 2) the group that received information about the company's stance and agreed with the stance, and 3) the group that received information about the company's stance and disagreed with the stance.

Insert Figures 4a and 4b here

OLS regression results with robust standard errors are reported in Table 5. Columns 1 and 2 report the average treatment effects of the employer supporting Trump's climate change policy, and of denouncing Trump's climate change policy, respectively, each compared to the employer not taking a stance. Columns 3 and 4 add as controls those variables which were not properly randomized across conditions, and Columns 5 and 6 add additional control variables intuitively likely to influence workers' willingness to complete extra work (gender, college degree, age, prior AMT experience, and prior AMT performance). Women completed more optional data points than men, and Model 3 reflects that workers whose primary reason for completing HITs on AMT is that it's their primary source of income were marginally more likely to complete optional data points. The coefficients corresponding to the main treatment variables of interest indicate that supporting Trump's climate change policy resulted in approximately two fewer optional data

points completed (out of 30) compared to the control, representing a 20% decrease in the extra work completed compared to the control group, while denouncing Trump's climate change policy had no statistically significant effect (though a directionally negative one) compared to the control.

Insert Table 5 here

Table 6 examines the effect of the employer taking a stance compared to not taking a stance (i.e., the control group) on extra work completed, depending on whether the employee agreed or disagreed with the employer's stance. Columns 1 and 2 do not include any controls, Columns 3 and 4 include controls for variables that were not well-randomized, and Columns 5 and 6 add additional controls that could intuitively influence workers' willingness to complete extra work. Completing three optional data points less than the control group on average, employees whose employers took a stance with which they disagreed completed 33% less extra work compared to employees whose employers did not take a stance on an issue (the control group). Employees whose employers took a stance with which they agreed completed a statistically equivalent number of extra data points compared to the control group. This supports the findings of the Upwork study which showed a *demotivational* effect of taking a social-political stance with which employees *disagree*, and no *motivational* effect of taking a social-political stance with which employees *agree*.

Insert Table 6 here

5.4.2. Mechanism: Perception of Shared Values and Beliefs and Identification with Employer

Table 7 demonstrates that employees' feeling that they share the values and beliefs of their employer and identification with their employer fully mediate (Baron and Kenny 1986) the demotivating effect of taking a social-political stance on an issue with which employees disagree.

Insert Table 7 here

Models 1 through 3 test mediation of the perception that the employer shares the employee's values and beliefs on the negative motivational effect of taking a social-political stance with which employees disagree (following Baron and Kenny 1986). Models 4 through 6 test mediation of the perception that the employee identifies with the employer on the demotivating effect of taking a stance with which employees disagree.[21] Model 1 demonstrates that taking a social-political stance with which employees disagree is negatively correlated with the perception that the employer shares the employee's values and beliefs. Model 2 demonstrates that this perception, in turn, is positively correlated with the number of optional data points completed. Model 3 demonstrates full mediation of taking a stance with which the employee disagrees on optional work completed by perception of shared values and beliefs; the coefficient on taking a stance with which the employee disagrees loses statistical significance with the inclusion of the mediating variable in the regression. Model 4 reflects that taking a social-political stance with which employees disagree is negatively correlated with identification with the employer. Model 5 demonstrates that identification with the employer, in turn, is positively correlated with extra work completed. Model 6 demonstrates full mediation of the effect of taking a stance with which employees disagree on (less) extra work completed by identification with the employer. As would be expected given the extant theory, the feeling that the employer shares an employee's values and beliefs is highly correlated with identification with the employer (corr=0.69). The results of these mediation analyses are consistent with the notion that the demotivating effect of taking a social-

[21] The results presented in Table 7 use as mediators continuous variables of agreement (on a 7-point Likert scale) with "I feel that this employer shares my values and beliefs" and "I identify with this employer." Results are robust to the use of binary variables for the mediators.

political stance are driven by perceptions of incongruent values and beliefs and a lack of identification with the employer.

6. Discussion and Conclusions

The importance of human capital to organizational success has been well-established (Campbell et al. 2012a, 2012b, Coff 1997, Foss and Lindenberg 2013, Huselid et al. 1997, Koch and McGrath 1996). This paper shows that corporate activism can influence employee motivation and performance. It demonstrates that an employer taking a stance on a social-political issue influences workers' motivation and willingness to complete extra work for their employer, and that this varies notably by whether the employee agrees or disagrees with the stance. As the first paper, to my knowledge, to consider the strategic implications of the burgeoning phenomenon that is corporate activism on a critical internal stakeholder – the employee – this paper contributes to the nascent scholarship on the strategic implications of CEOs and corporations taking stands on social-political issues outside the realm of their core businesses (Chatterji and Toffel 2016, 2017, Dodd and Supa 2014). Given the strong demotivating effect of taking a stance on an issue that employees do not agree with, the results of this paper highlight the risks of having an employee population that does not share the social-political values of the CEO and firm if a company chooses to take a stance on a social-political issue. This is in line with research that has shown the benefits of value congruence between employees and the firm more broadly (e.g., Cable and Edwards 2004, Edwards and Cable 2009). This paper suggests that *social-political* value congruence may be an important type of "value" in person-organization fit as well, and that a lack of social-political value congruence is demotivating for employees.

Given the importance of the job appearing to be like any other Upwork or AMT job to elicit revealed preferences and behavior of workers, I did not *first* ask workers' stance on Trump's climate change policy before telling them that of their employer (randomly assigned); for those who had a contrary stance on the issue, it would have seemed unrealistic for an Upwork or AMT employer to then tell them about a contrary stance via Upwork messenger (given the likely demotivating effect, a real employer would say nothing about its company's contrary stance in this setting, in which providing information such as this is completely voluntary and at the employer's discretion).[22] As a result, workers were asked to indicate their agreement with Trump's climate change policy *after* the completion of the job (and thus, after random assignment of conditions). It is thus possible that workers had the incentive to under-report their disagreement with their employer on the policy (i.e., if they were told that their employer was in support of Trump's climate change policy, they might have been less likely to report that they do not support the policy) on Upwork, where it is common to rehire prior Upwork workers. In the Upwork study, they were asked to fill out the optional survey after they were paid in full for completion of their job and were explicitly told at the beginning of the survey that their answers would not affect their likelihood of working with the employer in the future to mitigate this likelihood. Nonetheless, there may have been some social desirability bias in their responses, which could result in some of the workers being categorized as agreeing with their employer's stance when in fact they disagree with the stance; this would bias the effect of an employer taking a stance when employees agree with that stance downward and could explain part of the reason for the null (non-statistically significant) effect of taking a stance that the employee agrees with. This is less likely to be an issue

[22] I consulted with the founders of two start-up organizations that use Upwork for much of their human capital needs, and both confirmed that doing so would be unnatural and strange in the Upwork setting.

in the AMT study, where it is less common to rehire prior AMT workers other than via completion of a pre-qualification survey or job, which this job was not.

As with any field experiment in a given setting, it is important to note potential limitations of the generalizability of the results to other settings. This paper examined the effect of an employer taking a stance on a social-political issue on employees' motivation while completing short-term jobs for small amounts of pay. The fact that the results were robust to both the AMT and Upwork settings – to a job of 10 minutes in duration and 1 week in duration, for payment of $1 and for ten times that payment amount ($10), for U.S.-based workers only and workers not restricted to the U.S. – improves the paper's generalizability. Nonetheless, future work that examines whether similar effects hold for jobs that are longer term in nature and in-house would be important complements to this research. Additionally, I examined the effect of an employer taking a stand on one social-political issue in this study: President Trump's climate change policy. Future work could explore how effects vary for different types of social-political stances.

Online labor market platforms provide important benefits as a field experimental setting in which one examines effects on worker outcomes: no treatment-effect diffusion from treatment groups to control group because the workers work in isolation, and strict researcher control over the provision of the treatment since communication is done online. Additionally, these "gig worker" settings are becoming increasingly relevant for strategy and management scholars in their own right. The growth of online markets for contract labor has been rising at a fast pace.[23] Indeed, a 2016 Deloitte study indicated that 42 percent of executives anticipate an increase in the use of contingent workers in the next three to five years. A 2013 Accenture study predicted that future

[23] Workers in this market earned about $700 million by 2009, and the Financial Times estimated this market to be worth $1 billion annually by the end of 2012 (Horton et al. 2013). The number of employers billing on ODesk (since rebranded as Upwork) increased 800% between 2009 and 2013, and the number of working contractors per quarter increased by approximately 1,000% over the same period.

competitive advantage will hinge on "workers who aren't employees at all." Furthermore, it's not just entrepreneurial organizations that are leveraging online labor market platforms as sources of human capital; between 2016 and 2017, there has been over a 25% increase in the number of projects sourced via these platforms by Fortune 500 companies.[24] As there are few studies examining how employer-level characteristics influence the motivation of these non-traditional workers (Martins et al. 2004), this paper demonstrates that an employer taking a political stand on a social-political issue can influence the motivation and productivity of these workers.

From a practical perspective, this paper suggests that managers should be aware of their employees' stances on a given political or social issue prior to taking a public political stand, and should think twice about taking a stance that is incongruent with that of their employees.

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FIGURES AND TABLES

Figure 1: Messages, Per Condition
Experiment 1 (Upwork)

Control Group	Treatment Group A: Employer Denounces Trump's Climate Change Policy	Treatment Group B: Employer Supports Trump's Climate Change Policy
Also, though not directly relevant for your work with us, we wanted to let you know that our company will be changing its name in the near future. The CEO of this organization has decided to add the ending "Incorporated" to our company name.	Also, though not directly relevant for your work with us, we wanted to let you know that our company will be releasing a statement denouncing President Trump's decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement and continued lack of leadership on the issue of climate change. The CEO of this organization does not agree with President Trump's view on climate change.	Also, though not directly relevant for your work with us, we wanted to let you know that our company will be releasing a statement supporting President Trump's decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement and his continued leadership on the issue of climate change. The CEO of this organization agrees with President Trump's view on climate change.

Figure 2a: Kernel Densities of Number of Optional Words Translated, by Condition
Experiment 1 (Upwork)



Figure 2b: Kernel Densities of Number of Optional Words Translated, by Employee Agreement (or Disagreement) with Employer Stance
Experiment 1 (Upwork)



Figure 3: Messages, Per Condition
Experiment 2 (AMT)

Control Group	Treatment Group A: Employer Denounces Trump's Climate Change Policy	Treatment Group B: Employer Supports Trump's Climate Change Policy
In the meantime, we would like to let you know that we will be changing our MTurk requester name next month to {ommitted} at the recommendation of our CEO.	In the meantime, we would like to let you know that we will be releasing a statement denouncing President Trump's decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. The CEO of this organization does not support President Trump's view on climate change.	In the meantime, we would like to let you know that we will be releasing a statement supporting President Trump's decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. The CEO of this organization agrees with President Trump's view on climate change.

Figure 4a: Kernel Densities of Number of Optional Data Points Completed, by Condition
Experiment 2 (AMT)



Figure 4b: Kernel Densities of Number of Optional Data Points Completed, by Employee Agreement (or Disagreement) with Employer Stance
Experiment 2 (AMT)



Table 1: Sample Characteristics, by Condition (Randomization Balance)
Experiment 1 (Upwork)

	Control	Employer Denounces Trump's CC Policy	Employer Supports Trump's CC Policy
Demographic Characteristics			
Gender (Female=1; Male=0)	0.62 (0.50)	0.56 (0.50) [0.65]	0.56 (0.51) [0.67]
College (B.A. or higher = 1; lower than a B.A. = 0)	0.64 (0.49)	0.58 (0.50) [0.64]	0.76 (0.43) [0.28]
Age	40.12 (10.81)	36.60 (8.05) [0.13]	36.43 (9.75) [0.25]
Income ($50k=1, $50k-$80k = 2, >$80k=3)	1.67 (0.89)	**1.27 (0.68) [0.03]**	1.62 (0.89) [0.83]
From Latin & South America (Y=1, N=0)	0.30 (0.47)	0.42 (0.50) [0.30]	0.30 (0.46) [0.96]
From Spain (Y=1, N=0)	0.06 (0.24)	0.10 (0.31) [0.50]	0.08 (0.28) [0.74]
From United States (Y=1, N=0)	0.09 (0.29)	0.08 (0.28) [0.91]	0.19 (0.40) [0.25]
From Other Region (Y=1, N=0)	0.03 (0.17)	0.02 (0.14) [0.79]	0 [0.29]
Upwork Characteristics			
Number of Past Upwork Jobs	13.38 (44.89)	10.76 (41.97) [0.80]	15.06 (56.60) [0.90]
Money Earned on Upwork	875.38 (2592)	888.89 (58948.55) [0.47]	1503 (6657.92) [0.63]
Hourly Rate	13.88 (7.35)	11.21 (7.00) [0.12]	12.31 (6.10) [0.35]
Bid Amount	9.65 (1.11)	9.16 (1.62) [0.13]	9.38 (1.59) [0.41]
Job Proposal Rating	1.73 (0.67)	1.75 (0.76) [0.89]	1.81 (0.67) [0.63]
Primary Reason do Upwork Jobs (Y=1, N=0):			
"The money I earn on Upwork is my primary source of income."	0.18 (0.39)	**0.06 (0.24) [0.10]**	0.19 (0.40) [0.94]
"The money I earn on Upwork is not my primary source of income, but the main reason I work as a freelancer."	0.52 (0.51)	0.52 (0.50) [0.96]	0.41 (0.50) [0.36]
"It is a productive use of my free time."	0.09 (0.29)	**0.31 (0.47) [0.02]**	0.14 (0.35) [0.57]
Agree with Trump's Climate Change Policy (5 Point Likert Scale)	4.32 (0.99)	**4.83 (0.08) [0.01]**	**3.43 (1.50) [0.03]**
N	26 ; 29	43 ; 45	27 ; 35

Standard deviation reported in parentheses. P-value of the null that difference of means between the treatment group and the control group equals 0 is reported in brackets. Based on independent sample t-tests. Statistically different characteristics noted in bold. Lower sample size corresponds to self-reported characteristics obtained from optional survey, larger sample size corresponds to characteristics obtained from Upwork proposal (and thus, available for all workers).

Table 2: OLS Regression Results of Effect of Taking a Stance vs. No Stance
DV: Number of Optional Words Translated
Experiment 1 (Upwork)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Employer Supports Trump CC	-206.414		-283.748		-294.197	
	(195.089)		(198.420)		(178.114)	
Employer Denounces Trump CC		-131.503		188.555		210.291
		(204.404)		(239.488)		(262.628)
Income Bracket			578.494*	293.272	797.229**	391.846
			(332.869)	(296.259)	(335.763)	(318.638)
Upwork is my primary income.			409.925	517.892	494.658	545.480
			(292.253)	(378.086)	(293.139)	(391.616)
Upwork is a productive use of my free time.			-79.833	-171.235	293.014	-217.553
			(291.445)	(256.978)	(210.814)	(246.261)
Opinion of: Trump CC Policy			-159.652**	-239.177	-122.581*	-190.240
			(68.267)	(172.735)	(62.590)	(163.590)
Female					-336.960**	-178.168
					(160.080)	(217.227)
College Degree					-57.280	263.914
					(272.037)	(241.574)
Bid Amount					8.572	99.517*
					(54.478)	(55.976)
Hourly Rate					6.757	-9.973
					(15.321)	(15.130)
# Past Upwork Jobs					-8.009**	-2.272**
					(3.348)	(1.035)
Constant	469.414***	469.414***	340.398	1038.640	367.942	37.830
	(173.564)	(173.230)	(406.785)	(750.159)	(568.984)	(781.090)
N	65	74	45	63	45	61

Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Table 3: OLS Regression Results of Effect of Taking Stance in Agreement, Disagreement with Employees vs. No Stance
DV: Number of Optional Words Translated
Experiment 1 (Upwork)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Employee Agrees with Company	-104.903 (201.612)		119.954 (191.787)		209.067 (198.433)	
Employee Disagrees with Company		-381.247** (182.265)		-305.250 (235.289)		-499.048* (263.816)
Income Bracket			606.654 (387.054)	470.327 (298.407)	765.586** (370.675)	510.692* (275.077)
Upwork Is My Primary Income			333.012 (318.908)	491.580 (391.237)	368.298 (343.165)	762.277* (387.927)
Upwork Is a Productive Use of My Free Time			-137.859 (239.291)	-454.749 (546.284)	-193.100 (238.055)	-446.603 (435.750)
Opinion of Trump's CC Policy			-76.170 (60.734)	-177.197 (142.965)	-23.281 (59.493)	-68.650 (154.772)
Female					-193.978 (203.599)	-701.064*** (239.724)
College					190.132 (221.485)	-162.687 (377.992)
Bid Amount					92.596 (60.427)	-12.285 (74.047)
Hourly Rate					10.480 (11.820)	-8.933 (20.326)
# Past Upwork Jobs					-4.369** (1.976)	-1.892 (2.821)
Constant	469.414*** (173.167)	469.414** (175.199)	-30.963 (428.226)	570.557 (650.474)	-1252.182* (721.905)	1483.676 (917.370)
N	76	41	69	34	67	34

Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<0.10, **p<0.05, *p<0.01

Table 4: Sample Characteristics, by Condition (Randomization Balance) Experiment 2 (AMT)

	Control	Employer Denounces Trump's CC Policy	Employer Supports Trump's CC Policy
Demographic Characteristics			
Female (Y=1; N=0)	0.55 (0.50)	0.54 (0.50) [0.91]	0.61 (0.49) [0.13]
College degree (Y=1,N=0)	0.57 (0.50)	0.56 (0.50) [0.86]	0.58 (0.49) [0.68]
Age	34.42 (9.81)	34.54 (10.85) [0.89]	35.50 (11.56) [0.22]
Income (<$50K=1, $50-$80K = 2, >$80K=3)	1.65 (0.77)	1.72 (0.78) [0.25]	1.72 (0.81) [0.29]
AMT Characteristics			
HIT Approval Rate	96.42 (20.29)	98.02 (16.37) [0.30]	97.66 (17.51) [0.43]
HITs Per Week (<10=1; 10-49=2;50-100=3;>100=4)	2.69 (0.97)	2.66 (0.95) [0.78]	2.59 (1.02) [0.22]
Primary Reason work on MTurk (Y=1, N=0):			
"The money I earn on MTurk is my primary source of income."	0.19 (0.39)	**0.13 (0.33) [0.06]**	0.16 (0.37) [0.45]
"The money I earn on MTurk is not my primary source of income, but the main reason I complete HITs on MTurk."	0.55 (0.50)	**0.68 (0.47) [0.001]**	0.60 (0.49) [0.24]
"It is a productive use of my free time."	0.23 (0.42)	**0.17 (0.37) [0.07]**	0.23 (0.42) [0.98]
"It is fun."	0.04 (0.19)	0.02 (0.01) [0.39]	**0.01 (0.12) [0.08]**
Agreement with Trump's Climate Change Policy (7 Point Likert Scale)	5.54 (1.72)	5.58 (1.79) [0.81]	5.36 (1.97) [0.24]
N	297	283	285

Standard deviation reported in parentheses. P-value of the null that difference of means between the treatment group and the control group equals 0 is reported in brackets. Based on independent sample t-tests. Statistically different characteristics noted in bold. N for Likert scale question is N = 287, 273, 271 for each respective condition (since those who responded "I don't know what this [policy] is" are coded as missing for this variable.

Table 5: OLS Regression Results of Effect of Taking a Stance vs. No Stance
DV: Number of Optional Data Points Completed (out of 30)
Experiment 2 (AMT)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Employer Supports Trump's CC Policy	-1.933*		-1.834*		-2.172**	
	(1.063)		(1.061)		(1.055)	
Employer Denounces Trump's CC Policy		-1.194		-0.760		-0.834
		(1.072)		(1.074)		(1.063)
Primary reason AMT: my primary source of income			5.824*	0.516	4.751	0.297
			(3.513)	(3.666)	(3.309)	(3.414)
Primary reason AMT: extra money			0.867	-4.707	-0.388	-5.014
			(3.297)	(3.436)	(3.036)	(3.123)
Primary reason AMT: productive use of my free time			1.753	-3.473	1.283	-3.589
			(3.414)	(3.577)	(3.145)	(3.259)
Female					4.407***	3.496***
					(1.067)	(1.056)
College Degree					-1.106	-1.193
					(1.153)	(1.141)
Age					0.067	0.002
					(0.048)	(0.048)
Income Bracket					-0.220	0.439
					(0.685)	(0.732)
HITs per Week					-0.357	-0.672
					(0.559)	(0.577)
HIT Approval Rate					0.021	0.034
					(0.029)	(0.028)
Constant	10.508***	10.508***	8.556***	13.795***	4.804	10.562**
	(0.768)	(0.768)	(3.225)	(3.385)	(4.783)	(4.772)
N	582	580	582	580	582	580

Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Table 6: OLS Regression Results of Effect of Taking Stance in Agreement, Disagreement with Employees vs. No Stance
DV: Number of Optional Data Points Completed (out of 30)
Experiment 2 (AMT)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Employee Agrees with Company	-0.284		0.030		-0.312	
	(1.164)		(1.173)		(1.166)	
Employee Disagrees with Company		-3.406***		-3.250***		-3.352***
		(1.139)		(1.146)		(1.138)
Primary reason AMT: my primary source of income			1.814	5.714	1.967	5.356
			(3.747)	(3.953)	(3.713)	(3.633)
Primary reason AMT: extra money			-2.186	0.803	-2.747	-0.022
			(3.481)	(3.699)	(3.383)	(3.326)
Primary reason AMT: productive use of my free time			-0.921	1.214	-1.568	0.610
			(3.645)	(3.814)	(3.525)	(3.408)
Female					2.650**	3.958***
					(1.168)	(1.152)
College Degree					-0.738	-0.488
					(1.260)	(1.268)
Age					0.045	0.022
					(0.055)	(0.046)
Income Bracket					0.409	0.538
					(0.777)	(0.758)
HITs per week					-1.421**	-0.768
					(0.635)	(0.600)
HIT Approval Rate					0.051	0.023
					(0.031)	(0.027)
Constant	10.183***	10.183***	11.282***	8.442**	7.376	5.497
	(0.836)	(0.836)	(3.418)	(3.601)	(5.210)	(4.775)
N	493	461	493	461	493	461

Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Table 7: Mediation Analysis of Shared Values and Beliefs and Identification with Employer
OLS Regression Results
Experiment 2 (AMT)

DV:	I feel that this employer shares my values and beliefs	# Optional data points completed	# Optional data points completed	I identify with this employer	# Optional data points completed	# Optional data points completed
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Employee disagrees with company	-1.225***		-1.755	-0.871***		-1.643
	(0.149)		(1.282)	(0.147)		(1.149)
I feel that this employer shares my values and beliefs		1.427***	1.303***			
		(0.277)	(0.399)			
I identify with this Employer					1.663***	1.962***
					(0.269)	(0.359)
Primary reason AMT: my primary source of income	-0.500	0.549	6.007*	-0.475	0.447	6.287*
	(0.479)	(2.905)	(3.502)	(0.396)	(2.954)	(3.537)
Primary reason AMT: extra money	-0.627	-4.282	0.795	-0.926**	-3.946	1.795
	(0.450)	(2.668)	(3.201)	(0.359)	(2.726)	(3.257)
Primary reason AMT: productive use of my free time	-0.645	-2.588	1.452	-0.680*	-2.460	1.945
	(0.463)	(2.769)	(3.294)	(0.379)	(2.816)	(3.331)
Female	-0.233	3.556***	4.262***	-0.155	3.609***	4.262***
	(0.145)	(0.847)	(1.148)	(0.146)	(0.838)	(1.125)
College degree	-0.131	-1.398	-0.318	-0.386**	-1.215	0.268
	(0.151)	(0.916)	(1.248)	(0.153)	(0.918)	(1.244)
Age	-0.006	0.017	0.029	0.009	0.002	0.003
	(0.007)	(0.036)	(0.045)	(0.008)	(0.036)	(0.045)
Income bracket	-0.087	0.163	0.651	-0.042	0.133	0.620
	(0.093)	(0.558)	(0.740)	(0.095)	(0.556)	(0.725)
HITs per week	-0.036	-0.471	-0.720	0.059	-0.510	-0.884
	(0.075)	(0.454)	(0.598)	(0.072)	(0.452)	(0.592)
HIT approval rate	-0.003	0.026	0.026	-0.009**	0.034	0.040
	(0.004)	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.004)	(0.023)	(0.026)
Constant	6.041***	2.972	-2.376	5.741***	1.807	-5.767
	(0.659)	(4.241)	(5.050)	(0.609)	(4.273)	(4.864)
N	461	865	461	461	865	461

Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01